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CALCULATING JUDGMENT INTEREST AFTER
BANK OF AMERICA CANADA V. MUTUAL TRUST
CO.: DIFFICULTIES COMPOUNDED
GEOFFREY ROBERT COBHAM†

ABSTRACT
Until recently, compound judgment interest was only available in rare
circumstances, namely where courts exercised their equitable jurisdiction. Simple interest was the ordinary measure awarded by the courts.
However, in Bank of America Canada v. Mutual Trust Co. the Supreme
Court of Canada stunned Canadaʼ’s legal theorists and practitioners by
holding that compound judgment interest could be awarded at common
law. It was the ﬁrm belief of Major J. that such relief was necessary to
protect the full time value of money owed to judgment creditors.
This paper considers the hidden implications of the decision. Attention
is given to the Supreme Court of Canadaʼ’s ambiguous use of restitution principles in awarding compound interest. The context of the case
suggests that the Court was possibly referring to disgorgement, a type
of restitution. However, neither the terminology used, nor the circumstances of the case clarify whether this was the Courtʼ’s true intention.
Additionally, Major J. decided to limit the use of restitution principles
in cases of contract breach (where it traditionally was unavailable) to
those involving inefﬁcient breaches. The uncertainly with regard to
the extent of this limit is examined. Finally, consideration is given to
the possibility of contract rights attaining the status of property rights
through the Courtʼ’s apparent use of disgorgement principles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Bank of America Canada v. Mutual Trust Co.,1 the Supreme Court of
Canada made two surprising decisions. First, it held that there is a common law power to award compound rates on pre-judgment and postjudgment interest. Second, the Court may have decided that restitution
principles are applicable in a claim for damages for breach of contract.
The facts in Bank of America are as follows:
In 1987 Reemark Sterling I Ltd. (“Reemark”) decided to develop
condominium units. The respondent Mutual Trust Company (“Mutual
Trust”) negotiated with Reemark to create a Takeout Mortgage Commitment Agreement (“TOC”) on December 1, 1987. According to the
terms of the TOC, Mutual Trust agreed to provide mortgage ﬁnancing to
investors who wished to purchase the Reemark condominiums. On the
sale of a unit, the purchase funds were to be sent directly from Mutual
Trust to Reemark. Mutual Trust was to collect payments from the investors with interest compounded semi-annually. On December 1, 1988,
Bank of America Canada (“Bank of America”) agreed to ﬁnance the
cost of Reemarkʼ’s development and entered a loan agreement with Reemark. The interest on this loan was compounded monthly at Bank of
Americaʼ’s prime lending rate plus one percent. On December 16, 1988,
Bank of America, Mutual Trust and Reemark executed an assignment
of the TOC. The terms of the assignment incorporated the loan agreement dated December 1, 1988, and directed Mutual Trust to pay Bank of
America directly, following the sale of a Reemark condominium unit.
On July 31, 1991, Mutual Trust breached the TOC. Negotiations ensued between the three parties and on December 18, 1991, an amended
TOC was created (“ATOC”). Mutual Trust subsequently breached the
ATOC as well. Bank of America then appointed a receiver and had the
development sold for $22,500,000. However, Remark still owed Bank
of America for the difference of the $33,000,000 that was originally
advanced to Reemark under the loan agreement. As a result, Bank of
America pursued the deﬁciency and claimed damages for breach of contract under the TOC, the assigned TOC and the ATOC. At trial, damages
were awarded with compound interest at the prescribed rate in the loan
agreement. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the measure of dam1

2002 CarswellOnt 1114 [Bank of America].
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ages but substituted an award of simple interest. The Supreme Court of
Canada restored the trial award of compound interest.
Traditionally, compound interest on judgment awards was only
granted where a court exercised its equitable jurisdiction in cases involving breach of trust, breach of ﬁduciary duty, fraud, and expropriation. The object of awarding compound interest in these circumstances
was to compensate the plaintiff in full. Speaking for the Supreme Court
of Canada, Major J. held that the need to compensate fully for the time
value of judgment awards should not be restricted to the traditional categories; Major J. decided to make what he described as an incremental
change to the common law by creating a common law power to award
compound interest on judgment awards. It is now no longer necessary
to invoke a courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction in order to obtain compound
interest on a judgment award.
In changing the common law, Major J. relied on compensatory principles as well as principles of restitution. The use of restitution principles
was unnecessary. Compensatory principles alone could have obtained
the same result. The following will demonstrate that Major J. was in fact
using restitution principles in the sense of “disgorgement of proﬁts” in
order to make his change to the common law appear less drastic.
Disgorgement, a type of restitutionary remedy, has traditionally been
available in cases involving a plaintiffʼ’s proprietary interests. Implicit in
Major J.ʼ’s judgment is his reliance on the availability of disgorgement
of proﬁts where the proprietary interests of a plaintiff are involved. The
proprietary interest at issue in Bank of America was the debt owed by
Mutual Trust to Bank of America. Speciﬁc performance is available as a
matter of course in actions to recover a debt and the availability of speciﬁc performance is akin to a proprietary interest. Major J. effectively
disguised the disgorgement of proﬁts in an action involving proprietary
interests by awarding compound interest. Since disgorgement of proﬁts
has been available for actions for breach of contract involving proprietary interests, and there was a proprietary interest at issue in Bank of
America, Major Jʼ’s decision to award compound interest at common
law as a disgorgement of proﬁts seems less drastic in nature. His award
of compound interest can be said to have disgorged any proﬁt made by
Mutual Trust by retaining the funds owed to Bank of America.
In implicitly utilizing restitution principles in an action for breach
of contract, Major J. seems to have realised that he might appear to
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be simultaneously making restitution generally available in actions for
breach of contract. This was not his intention; he merely wanted to use
disgorgement principles as a vehicle to ease the transition to allowing compound interest at common law. He was concerned, and rightly
so, that by making restitution readily available in actions for breach
of contract, he could eliminate the distinction between contract rights
and property rights. To protect that distinction, Major J. placed a limit
on the availability of restitution in contract by limiting it to cases involving non-efﬁcient breaches. In so doing, he made the availability of
restitution possibly redundant,2 as compensatory principles alone would
sufﬁce in cases where there is no efﬁcient breach. This redundancy supports the view that Major J.ʼ’s use of restitution principles was premised
solely on the desire to make the change to the common law appear incremental.
However, Major J.ʼ’s decision to restrict restitution to cases involving non-efﬁcient breach may not be interpreted so narrowly by judges
in future cases. In fact, in Bank of America the Court applied restitution principles in a factual situation that involved an efﬁcient breach.
Since Mutual Trustʼ’s breach did not fall within the traditional categories
wherein compound interest was regularly awarded, Mutual Trust may
have relied on the existing law, prior to Bank of America, as authority
limiting it to the payment of simple interest on any judgment award obtained by Bank of America. In addition, the Supreme Court stated that
efﬁcient breach should not be discouraged, not that it must not be discouraged. Hence, it is plausible that judges will interpret Bank of America as simply setting out a general principle that ordinarily restricts restitution to cases of inefﬁcient breach, thereby making restitution available
in claims for damages for breach of contract in some instances where
an efﬁcient breach is present. This would be an extraordinary change,
as restitution in the sense of unjust enrichment has not previously been
available in claims for damages for breach of contract. Further, the Supreme Courtʼ’s use of the term “restitution” is ambiguous. The facts and
the nature of the cause of action suggest that “disgorgement” was the
intended meaning. This is so not only because of the Courtʼ’s implicit
reliance on the proprietary interest at issue, but also due to the fact that

2

McInnes, infra note 112 at 132.
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the claim was for breach of contract. This ambiguity could result in additional confusion when Bank of America is applied to future cases.
To date, courts have fortunately been applying the Bank of America decision based on its compensatory principles alone. However, the
ambiguities in the case leave open the possibility for future decisions
to allow claims for restitution for simple breach of contract actions.
This would be unfortunate as the distinction between contract rights
and property rights would thereby be diminished, especially if the term
“restitution” is used in the sense of disgorgement of proﬁts. Allowing
disgorgement for a simple breach of contract, where the expectation
measure is the traditional measure of damages, could have the effect of
making such a claim speciﬁcally enforceable. Efﬁcient breaches would
no longer be possible. Breaching parties would always be forced to return gains made by a breach, even where the plaintiff was already fully
compensated. This would have a punitive effect on breaching parties,
as non-breaching parties would be able to extort from them the anticipated cost of performance, as opposed to its value, upon breach. In other
words, a non-breaching party would be able to obtain more than full
compensation for the effects of a breach.
The possible consequences of his decision reveal that Major J. was
making more than a mere “incremental change” to the common law. It
is true that the main purpose of expectation damages is to compensate a
plaintiff in full, and in that sense he was correct to endorse the doctrine
of efﬁcient breach. However, an ancillary character of the expectation
damages rule is that it prevents proﬁt from breach. The same result could
have been achieved by compensatory principles alone, and the Court
could have avoided the ambiguities ﬂowing from its use of restitutionary principles. It is indeed true that by using compensatory principles
alone it would no longer be open for the Court to rely on disgorgement
principles as a method to change the common law incrementally. This
may, however, have been the sort of change which is best left provincial
legislatures. The provinces had enacted legislation that set out a rule
which generally allowed simple interest on judgment awards. The resulting compensation for plaintiffs may have been less than perfect using simple interest, but at least the law was certain. Often all that can be
achieved by lawmakers is an imperfect but predictable rule. The proper
role of a court is not to attempt to legislate a more perfect rule; rather,
this demands proper legislative reform.
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II. AVAILABILITY OF COMPOUND RATES FOR PRE-JUDGMENT
AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
In Bank of America, the Supreme Court of Canada broke from the traditional view that compound interest is unavailable on pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest. In this case, the Court examined the circumstances under which judgment interest is available pursuant to the Ontario Courts of Justice Act.3 While s. 128(1) permits awarding pre-judgment interest, s. 128(4)(b) indicates that “interest shall not be awarded
under subsection (1) on interest accruing under this section.” Prior to
Bank of America, it was commonly thought that such wording precluded awards of compound interest on judgments. The CJA also provides
for post-judgment interest in s. 129(1), which states that “money owing under an order, including costs to be assessed or costs ﬁxed by the
Court, bears interest at the post-judgment interest rate, calculated from
the date of the order.” With regard to post-judgment interest, there is no
provision analogous to s. 128(4)(b).
At the trial level of Bank of America, Justice Farley relied on s. 130
of the CJA in granting compound interest for the pre-judgment and postjudgment periods.4 In awarding interest on judgments, a court is given
considerable discretion by s. 130(1), which reads:
The Court may, where it considers it just to do so, in respect of the
whole or any part of the amount on which interest is payable under
section 128 or 129,
(a) disallow interest under either section;
(b) allow interest at a rate higher or lower than that provided in
either section;
(c) allow interest for a period other than that provided in either
section.

In exercising its discretion under s. 130(1), a court may examine a host
of factors set out in s. 130(2), including any considerations that it deems
relevant.5
3

R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43.
[1998] O.J. No. 1525 (QL).
5
Courts of Justice Act, supra note 3, s.130(g).
4
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The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judgment but reversed
Justice Farleyʼ’s decision to award compound interest.6 Justice Goudge
held that s. 130 did not allow for the awarding of compound interest.7
He felt that compound interest could only be awarded using the Courtʼ’s
equitable jurisdiction, as such jurisdiction was the sort of “right” contemplated by s. 128(4)(g) and s. 129(5).8 Dealing with pre-judgment
interest, s. 128(4)(g) states that “interest shall not be awarded under
subsection (1), where interest is payable by a right other than under this
section.” With regard to post-judgment interest, s. 129(5) reads “interest shall not be awarded under this section where interest is payable by
a right other than under this section.”9 Justice Goudgeʼ’s decision was
consistent with the law as it stood to that point. In considering the Supreme Courtʼ’s reasoning in awarding compound interest at common law
it is helpful to understand the circumstances in which compound interest was traditionally available. Once the common law as it traditionally
stood is examined, it becomes apparent why Justice Major thought that
it was too restrictive.
1. Traditional Grounds for Granting Compound Interest on
Judgment Awards
Traditionally, compound interest was only available in cases involving breaches of ﬁduciary duty, fraud, and expropriation. In Harrison
v. Mathieson,10 it was held that compound interest could be awarded
when a ﬁduciary or trustee who had a duty to invest entrusted monies
breached a ﬁduciary obligation. Meredith C.J.O. held that it was:
proper to take the account with annual rests, for the reason that…
it was the duty of the trustee to have invested the money which
he misapplied; and, if he had done so, the investment would have
produced ﬁve per cent compound interest.11

6

[2000] O.J. No. 704 (QL).
Ibid. at para 55.
8
Ibid. at para 49.
9
Courts of Justice Act, supra note 3.
10
(1916), 30 D.L.R. 150 (Ont. S.C.A.D.).
11
Ibid. at 158.
7
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This line of reasoning was endorsed in Wallersteiner v. Moir,12 which
involved a company director who misused company funds for his own
beneﬁt in his ﬁduciary capacity. Buckley L.J. held that “ it is well established in equity that a trustee who in breach of trust misapplies trust
funds will be liable not only to replace the misapplied principal fund
but to do so with interest from the date of the misapplication.”13 The
rationale for such a holding was that such a trustee is presumed to have
retained the trust funds and to have used them for his own purposes.14
Buckley L.J. went on to say “where a trustee has retained trust money in
his own hands, he will be accountable for the proﬁt which he has made
or which he is assumed to have made from the use of the money.”15
A defaulting trustee will be accountable for simple interest only, but
where a trustee uses trust funds in trade he may be charged compound
interest. Buckley L.J. indicates that the justiﬁcation for charging compound interest in such instances “lies in the fact that proﬁts earned in
trade would likely be used as working capital for earning further profits.”16 It was further posited that in commercial transactions involving
misappropriated trust funds, a court should presume that the transaction
was proﬁtable for the trustee absent evidence to the contrary.17 Hence,
there is no need to prove any actual proﬁt being made where trust funds
are inappropriately used in commercial transactions by the trustee; profit will be imputed. In Wallersteiner, the director was presumed to have
made a proﬁt when he used company funds in commercial transactions
and was ordered to pay compound interest.
Denning M.R., as he then was, agreed with Buckley L.J. that compound interest should have been awarded in the circumstances. Denning
M.R. stated that it is to be presumed that:
the company (had it not been deprived of the money) would have
made the most beneﬁcial use open to it… . Alternatively, it should
be presumed that the wrongdoer made the most beneﬁcial use of it.
But, whichever it is, in order to give adequate compensation, the
12

[1975] 1 All E.R. 849 (C.A.) [Wallersteiner].
Ibid. at 863.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid. Buckley L.J. also held that this presumption applied to agents who retained monies of
their principals.
17
Ibid. at 864.
13
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money should be replaced with interest yearly rests, i.e. compound
interest.18

In addition to positing a presumption that a trustee makes a proﬁt from
the use of misappropriated trust funds, Denning M.R. makes it clear that
the awarding of compound interest is based on compensatory principles.
This is evidenced by the passage above wherein Denning M.R. states
to “give adequate compensation,” and by his statement that a “mere
replacement of money – years later – is by no means adequate compensation, especially in days of inﬂation.”19 Since inﬂation is an ongoing
process, it would be reasonable to argue that compound interest will
always be necessary to compensate in such situations. This logic seems
to be inherent in Justice Majorʼ’s decision.
The principles enunciated in Wallersteiner have been followed in
Ontario on numerous occasions. Brock v. Cole20 was the ﬁrst case expressly to follow Wallersteiner. The plaintiff in Brock advanced $20,000
on February 11, 1974 to his solicitors. The solicitors were supposed to
use the money to enable their company to purchase land appraised at
$40,000 as mortgagors, and were to deliver a ﬁrst mortgage to the plaintiff as mortgagee. The mortgage was to be for a term of three months,
with interest accruing at eighteen percent. As of August 1974, the plaintiff had yet to hear from his solicitors regarding the transaction. In October 1974, the plaintiff received a ﬁrm trust cheque for $3,095 for interest
on his outstanding funds. Later in the same month he ﬁnally received a
second mortgage, instead of a ﬁrst as was initially agreed, on a property
that was bought for only $16,000. The property was eventually sold, but
the plaintiff never received more than the $3,095 ﬁrm trust cheque.
Thorson J.A. held that the plaintiff was entitled to compound interest on $20,000 at ten percent per annum from May 11, 1974 onwards.
In coming to its decision, the Court of Appeal considered s. 36(5) of the
Judicature Act.21 Paragraphs 36(5)(b) and s. 36(5)(f) of the Judicature
Act are identical to paragraphs 128(4)(b) and s. 128(4)(g) of the Courts
of Justice Act. Thorson J.A. held that s. 36(5)(f) constitutes a statutory
recognition that rights to interest on judgment claims that are found out18

Wallersteiner, supra note 12 at 856.
Wallersteiner, supra note 12 at 856.
20
(1983), 142 D.L.R. (3d) 461 (C.A.) [Brock].
21
R.S.O. 1980, c. 223.
19
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side the general provisions of s. 36 of the Judicature Act continue to
exist.22 Further, it was noted that nothing in s. 36 demonstrates a legislative intent to abrogate the authority of a court, applying well-recognized
principles of equity, to award compound interest in cases in which it
is just and proper to do so.23 Compound interest is available in cases
where trustees fail to invest entrusted money as instructed, and thereby
earn compound interest, and also in cases where money is wrongfully
detained when it ought to have been paid.24
There was some discussion in Brock that the wording “payable by a
right other than under this section” precluded the equitable application
of compound interest. It was suggested that equitable remedies do not
constitute “rights,” as courts always have discretion to refrain from applying equitable remedies.25 Thorson J.A. felt that such an interpretation
would place too narrow a meaning on the word “right”, “if on the facts
before the Court no reasons or ground has been advanced upon which
the Court, acting judicially, could properly refuse such an order.”26
The Court went on to adopt the reasoning of Buckley L.J. and Denning M.R. in Wallersteiner, and held that the defendant could be presumed to have earned compound interest in using the plaintiffʼ’s funds
in the course of its real estate ventures. Similar to Denning M.R. in
Wallersteiner, Thorson J.A. emphasized that the plaintiff would not be
adequately compensated by an award of simple interest.27 Hence, the
plaintiff was entitled to compounded judgment interest from May 11,
1974 onwards.
The Brock decision was followed in Claiborne Industries Ltd. v.
National Bank of Canada,28 and most recently in Confederation Life
Insurance Co. v. Shepherd, McKenzie, Plaxton, Little & Jenkins.29 Claiborne was an action brought for breach of trust, and for conspiracy. In
awarding compound interest, the Court adopted the principles set out in
Brock indicating that:
22

Brock, supra note 20 at 466.
Brock, supra note 20 at 467.
24
Brock, supra note 20 at 467.
25
Iaccobucci J. notes, in Air Canada v. LCBO, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581 at para. 86, that the awarding
of compound interest is discretionary.
26
Brock, supra note 20 at 466.
27
Brock, supra note 20 at 469.
28
1989 CarswellOnt 1425 (C.A.) [Claiborne].
29
(1996) 88 O.A.C. 398 (Ont. C.A.) [Confederation].
23
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a right other than under this sectionʼ’ [in s.36(5)(f) of the Judicature
Act] included the general jurisdiction of the Court to award compound
interest where there is a wrongful detention of money which ought to
have been paid. This is on the theory that it is reasonable to assume
that the wrongdoer made the most beneﬁcial use of the money and
is accountable for the proﬁts. A reasonable use of money implies
compounding interest at some appropriate interval.30

In Confederation, the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the principles put forth in Brock, but distinguished it on the facts.
Compound interest is regularly awarded in equity with respect to
cases dealing with expropriation. In British Paciﬁc Properties Ltd. v.
British Columbia (Minister of Highways & Public Works),31 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a compound interest award made by an
arbitrator. The case revolved around a narrow interpretation of s. 3 of
the Federal Interest Act,32 which purported to ﬁx interest rates at ﬁve
percent “whenever any interest is payable by agreement or parties or
by law, and no rate is ﬁxed by such an agreement or by law.” Laskin
C.J.C. held that an award of interest at a speciﬁed rate made by arbitrators in ﬁxing compensation for expropriated land pursuant to a statutory
authority is payable by law and escapes the limitations of s. 3 of the
Interest Act.33
Similar to instances of breach of trust or ﬁduciary duties, the purpose
of granting compound interest in cases of expropriation is to compensate
fully the landowner who has lost the value of his or her land. In Mannix v. The Queen,34 the Alberta Court of Appeal stated that compound
interest is appropriate in cases of expropriation, because the landowner
is entitled to be compensated so as to be left economically whole.35 The
Court further held on the facts of the case it could be expected that
the landowner would have followed prudent investment practices had
the money been available, and would have invested at investorʼ’s rates,
rather than at lower borrowerʼ’s rates.36 Again there is a presumption that

30

Claiborne, supra note 28 at para. 166.
1980 CarswellBC 575 (S.C.C.)[British Paciﬁc Properties].
32
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-15.
33
British Paciﬁc Properties, supra note 31 at para. 10.
34
[1984] A.J. No. 722 (C.A.) (QL) [Mannix].
35
Ibid. at para. 13.
31
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the person kept out of funds would have made the best available use of
those funds had they been promptly available.
Finally, it should be noted that compound interest has been available
in some cases not involving equitable remedies for breach of trust, fraud
or expropriation. For example, in Roman Catholic Diocese of Calgary
Association for Seniors v. Century Insurance,37 a dispute arose between
the insured plaintiff and the insurer as to whether or not a ﬁre insurance
policy had lapsed. In ﬁnding that the policy had not lapsed, the Court
held that the insured was entitled to compound interest on the insurance
proceeds equal to the amount the insured would have earned had it been
able to deposit the proceeds in an existing term deposit which was compounded monthly.38 The Court felt that the plaintiff had proved that it
regularly deposited funds into a term deposit during the time it was kept
out of the insurance proceeds, and presumed that the plaintiff would
have invested the proceeds in the same account had they been promptly
available. Hence, in cases not involving breach of trust, breach of ﬁduciary duty, or expropriation, a plaintiff may be entitled to compound interest if he or she can prove that money withheld by the defendant would
otherwise have been invested at a compound rate.
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, there is ample authority to
support an award of compound interest in equity for breach of trust or
breach of ﬁduciary duty, expropriation and in cases where a plaintiff
has been kept out of money rightfully due that would have otherwise
been invested at compound rates. While compound interest was readily
available in such cases, it was not traditionally available at common law
prior to Bank of America.
The traditional position of refusing awards of compound interest
at common law was adopted by the House of Lords in Westdeutsche
Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London Borough Council.39 Speak-

36

Ibid. at para. 14.
(1984) 8 D.L.R. (4th) 435 (Alta. C.A.).
38
Ibid. at 441.
37
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ing for the majority, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that in the absence
of fraud, compound interest has never been awarded except against a
trustee or other person owing a ﬁduciary duty who is accountable for
proﬁts made from his position.40 The award of compound interest was
restricted to cases where the award was in lieu of an account of proﬁts
made improperly by the trustee.41 Since there was no trust or ﬁduciary relationship between the bank and the borough, compound interest
could not be awarded. Lord Browne-Wilkinson went on to state that
Parliament expressly forbid the awarding of compound interest in the
Supreme Court Act, 1981. However, the Act did not impinge on the
awarding of interest in equity. He forcefully stated that:
your Lordships would be usurping the function of Parliament if, by
expanding the equitable rules for the award of compound interest,
this House were now to hold that the Court exercising its equitable
jurisdiction in aid of the common law can award compound interest
which the statutes have expressly not authorized the Court to award
in exercise of its common law jurisdiction.42

Both Lord Slynn of Hadley43 and Lord Lloyd of Berwick44 agreed that
creating a common law power to award compounded judgment interest
would usurp the function of Parliament, and that legislative reform was
needed if there was to be any change.
Given the state of authorities leading up to the Supreme Courtʼ’s decision in Bank of America, it is apparent that the Ontario Court of Ap39

[1996] H.L.J. No. 15 (QL) [Westdeutsche]. The case involved an interest rate swap agreement between a bank and the Islington London Borough Council. Such agreements are in effect
wagers, where one party agrees to pay interest at a ﬁxed rate on a notional capital sum over a
ﬁxed period, while the other party agrees to pay a ﬂoating rate of interest calculated by market
rates on the same sum over the same period. No payment is actually made until the end of the
stipulated period, where the unsuccessful party pays the difference between the two results.
However, the bank made an upfront payment of £2,500,000 to the borough. The agreement
was an attractive way for the borough to raise some additional capital while avoiding statutory
controls. However, such agreements were ultra vires the borough. The bank paid £1,354,474 on
the agreement. At trial, the borough was ordered to pay £1,145,526, which amounted to the balance of the £2,500,000 originally put up front. The borough did not object to paying the amount
ordered, but did appeal the award of compound interest.
40
Ibid. at para. 69.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid. at para. 129.
43
Ibid. at paras. 135, 137.
44
Ibid. at paras. 202, 206.
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peal decision was consistent with precedent. Further, the clear wording
of s. 128(4)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act seemed to prevent an award
of compound interest at common law. Hence, in similar fashion to the
House of Lords decision in Westdeutsche, the Ontario Court of Appeal
was reluctant to usurp the function of the legislature by stretching the
meaning of the Courts of Justice Act. This leads one to ask why the
Supreme Court of Canada would reverse a decision that was consistent
with precedent?
The Supreme Courtʼ’s decision is correctly premised on the compensatory nature of compound interest as discussed by Denning M.R. in
Wallersteiner and in subsequent cases. Compound interest was awarded
as a method of ensuring full compensation for the plaintiff. It provides
the plaintiff the full time value of the money owed to him. Major J.
simply did not think that it was appropriate to limit full compensation to
cases invoking the equitable jurisdiction of the Court. To adhere to such
a restriction effectively prevents full compensation in other cases. The
time value of money is always affected in any judgment award, regardless of whether a courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction is exercised.
Several commentators have argued that there was no principled basis to restrict the awarding of compound interest.45 The refusal to award
compound interest keeps the plaintiff out of money that is properly due
at the date of the wrong, which the plaintiff could have in turn invested
at compound rates.46 Mary Anne Waldron, in The Law of Interest in
Canada, notes that the primary reason for excluding compound interest
has been that it was considered too difﬁcult to calculate. She argues,
however, that
since commercial practice virtually without exception compounds
interest, and considering the substantial difference that compounding
can make in time of high rates and slow litigation, no rationale
remains for prohibiting compound interest.47

It is no longer the case that it is too difﬁcult to calculate compound interest.
45
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The Supreme Court of Canada in Bank of America was cognizant
of the unfairness of limiting compound interest to courtsʼ’ equitable jurisdiction, and of the fact that it is no longer too difﬁcult to calculate
compound interest.48 The Court held that it no longer makes sense to
limit compound interest to cases involving equitable principles. Major
J. realised that the full measure of expectation damages for breach of
contract cannot not be achieved if compound interest is limited to the
Courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction. Full compensation is not awarded if a
plaintiff is limited to receiving simple interest on a judgment award, as
the plaintiff does not receive the full time value of the principal sum of
the award.49 Hence, Major J. strayed from precedent and the clear wording of the Courts of Justice Act to create a common law power permitting the awarding of both pre-judgement and post-judgment compound
interest. In doing so, Major J. correctly used compensatory principles
for the reasons set out above. He also, however, remarkably used restitution principles to support his decision, even though the case was
premised on an action for breach of contract. Restitution for an unjust
enrichment was traditionally not available where a plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract.
While the change to the common law to allow compound interest is
desirable so as to compensate the plaintiff in full, the change could have
been made solely on compensatory principles; anything further would
have been best left to the legislature. The references to restitution were
most likely used to ease the transition to allowing compound interest at
common law; in other words, the restitution analysis assisted Major J.
to make the transition appear to be an “incremental change.” Compound
interest can be viewed as similar to a disgorgement of proﬁts if the plaintiff is awarded the actual compound interest made by the defendant on
the money that is rightfully due to the plaintiff. Disgorgement of proﬁts,
a type of restitution remedy, has been awarded in cases where plaintiffs
have sought damages for breach of contract where proprietary interests
were involved. The plaintiff in Bank of America was suing in breach of
contract over the non-payment of a debt. An action on a debt entitles a
plaintiff to speciﬁc performance as a matter of course, not as of right.50
48

Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 44.
Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 23.
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Since speciﬁc performance is available as a matter of course for a debt
owed, it can be argued to be akin to a proprietary right in the sense that
the plaintiff is generally entitled to the actual debt owed. Since a remedy in speciﬁc performance is in effect proprietary in nature, it could
be argued that the issue in dispute in Bank of America was proprietary.
Hence, in this light, using disgorgement principles to award compound
interest assists Justice Majorʼ’s claim that he was making an incremental
change to the common law.51 Implicit in Major J.ʼ’s reasoning is that
he was merely allowing a disgorgement of proﬁts in a claim involving
proprietary interests – the disgorgement being the shifting of compound
interest, presumably earned by Mutual Trust, to Bank of America.
As will be discussed below, the reference to restitution principles
in awarding compound interest was unnecessary and creates problems
which are difﬁcult to resolve. In order to understand better Major J.ʼ’s
use of restitution principles in an action for breach of contract, it will be
helpful to address the availability of restitution in contract prior to Bank
of America.

III. RESTITUTION IN A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT?
1. Expectation Damages, Reliance Damages and Speciﬁc
Performance
In Bank of America, the plaintiff claimed damages for breach of contract. The usual measure of damages in breach of contract is the expectation measure. As Parke B. held in Robinson v. Harman:
the rule of the common law is, that where a party sustains a loss by
reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to
be placed in the same situation with respect to damages, as if the
contract had been performed.52

This proposition was followed by the Privy Council in Wertheim v.
Chicoutimi Pulp Co.,53 and was expressly adopted by the Supreme
51

Bank of America, supra note 1 at para. 43.
(1848), 154 E.R. 363 at 365.
53
[1911] A.C. 301.
52

CALCULATING JUDGEMENT INTEREST . . . 81

Court of Canada in Haack v. Martin.54 In an ordinary claim for breach
of contract, the plaintiff is entitled to receive the value, not the cost, of
the expected performance of the contract at the date of the breach.
While the usual measure of damages for breach of contract will be
the expectation measure, this is not invariably so. The plaintiff may also
receive reliance damages or speciﬁc performance. Reliance damages
are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for actual costs incurred in contemplation of, or in preparation for, the performance of the contract.
They are awarded where expectation damages are inappropriate (when,
for example, they are too speculative). Further, reliance damages are an
alternative measure of damage; the plaintiff is not entitled to both expectation and reliance damages.55 Speciﬁc performance may be awarded
in certain circumstances, especially in contracts dealing with land.
In Bank of America, the trial judge awarded the shortfall between
the sale price obtained by the receiver and the amount outstanding under
the Loan Agreement and the TOC Assignment. This award was never in
dispute. Major J. could have exercised the Courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction and awarded compound interest as an extension of the trial judge
awarding speciﬁc performance in enforcing the debt. But, as is evident
from the above analysis, the speciﬁc enforcement of a debt alone is not
traditionally sufﬁcient to invoke the Courtʼ’s power to award compound
interest in equity. The Supreme Court in Bank of America did not think
it appropriate to extend the scope of awarding compound interest in equity to include the speciﬁc performance of a debt. Further, it was stated
earlier that Major J. did not think it desirable to limit compound interest
to the Courtʼ’s equitable jurisdiction, as such a scheme ignores the need
to extend fully the compensatory character of compound interest to all
judgment awards.
Rather than extend the circumstances under which a court could
award compound interest in equity, Major J. indicated that he was making an incremental change to the common law so as to allow the awarding of compound interest. As is discussed below, it appears that the
change was not incremental but substantial. In making the allegedly incremental change, Major J. relied upon restitution principles, despite the
fact that restitution is not traditionally a remedy for breach of contract.
54
55
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2. Restitution in Actions For Unjust Enrichment
Until recently, courts have generally refused to award restitution for a
mere breach of contract. The traditional view was that where there was a
repudiatory breach,56 the non-breaching party had two courses of action.
He or she could decide to treat the contract as ongoing and seek expectation damages or speciﬁc performance; alternatively, the innocent party
could consider the contract as at an end and choose to pursue a claim of
restitution for any beneﬁts it had conferred on the guilty party. The term
“restitution” as used here denotes situations in which one party seeks
to retrieve beneﬁts that it has conferred on another party – it is a claim
for unjust enrichment. This is distinct from “disgorgement of proﬁts.”
In cases of disgorgement, one party seeks to obtain proﬁts made by the
other party, which can be unrelated to any beneﬁt conferred by the other
party. Disgorgement of proﬁts can be awarded regardless of whether
the defendant has been enriched. Both claims for unjust enrichment and
claims for disgorgement of proﬁts are said to be restitutionary remedies.
It is important to note, however, that the two remedies are distinct in
nature, and are available in different circumstances.
In contractual relations, it is not open to the innocent party both to
afﬁrm the contract and to seek restitution.57 In pursuing restitution, the
parties are treated as if there never was any contract between them. This
is not, however, entirely realistic. It has been suggested that the contract
cannot be entirely ignored, as the plaintiffʼ’s restitution claim can only
be established if it is unjust for the defendant to retain a beneﬁt conferred, and it is only unjust if the beneﬁt expected to be received by the
plaintiff under the contract has substantially failed.58
A plaintiff claiming restitution traditionally had to establish that a
beneﬁt was conferred upon the defendant, and that the defendant had
completely failed to give any consideration in return. If, however, a contract was fully performed by the plaintiff, and the defendant refused to
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pay the contract price, restitution was not available.59 The requirement
for a total failure of consideration was set out in Hunt v. Silk.60 In that
case, a landlord agreed to grant early possession to his tenant in exchange for a deposit. The landlord further agreed to execute a lease for a
period of nineteen years, and promised to perform certain repairs within
ten days of the tenant taking possession. After the ten days had elapsed,
with no action taken by the landlord, the tenant attempted to rescind
the agreement and sought the return of his deposit. Lord Ellenborough
C.J. held that in order for restitution to be available, the parties must be
capable of being restored to the status quo.61 Since the agreement had
been partially executed and the plaintiff had received some of the beneﬁt of the bargain through his use of the premises, restitution was not
available.
The need for a total lack of consideration on the part of the defendant has since been relaxed, so as to permit the plaintiff to receive
some beneﬁt under the bargain. As Maddaugh and McCamus point out,
Giles v. Edwards62 is now the preferred authority among contemporary
scholars.63 In Giles, the defendant was to cut, cord and deliver all of his
cordwood at given location. A ﬁxed sum was to be paid for every cord of
wood. The defendant cut and corded some wood, and the plaintiff paid
him twenty guineas. When the defendant failed to cord the rest of the
wood, the Court awarded the plaintiff the return of its twenty guineas.64
Hence, even though the plaintiff had received some beneﬁt, it was still
possible to recover the funds it had advanced to the defendant.65 Madd59
Morrison-Knudsen v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (No.2) (1978), 85 D.L.R.
(3d) 186 (B.C.C.A.). Where the plaintiff fully performed his or her end of the bargain, a claim
for damages for breach of contract will be limited to the agreed contract price, as this will give
the plaintiff exactly which he or she expected to receive. Anything more would allow the plaintiff to recover for making a bad bargain.
60
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from the defendant is further supported in Rowland v. Divall, [1923] 2 K.B. 500 at 506 (C.A.)
[Rowland]. In Rowland, the defendant sold a stolen car to the plaintiff. Despite having had the
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augh and McCamus note that Hunt can be reconciled with the approach
in Giles, if it is interpreted as positing that the plaintiffʼ’s occupation
after knowledge of the breach amounted to a waiver of his right to terminate the agreement.66
Courts have shown some willingness to offset the partial beneﬁt derived from a plaintiff against awards of restitution. In Gibbons v. Trapp
Motors,67 the plaintiff was sold a defective car by the defendant. Numerous attempts were made by the defendant to repair the defects to
no avail. The plaintiff was awarded the full purchase price paid for the
car, but a reasonable allowance was deducted for the value of the use
of the car and for the failed repair attempts.68 The foregoing cases demonstrate that the law has been modiﬁed somewhat to allow a plaintiff to
receive restitution, despite having received some consideration from the
defendant, and such partial consideration received from the defendant
may be offset against the plaintiffʼ’s claim for restitution.
As mentioned above, restitution, in the sense being discussed here,
is based upon principles of unjust enrichment. The leading Canadian authority on unjust enrichment is Peter v. Beblow.69 In that case, there was
no contract; rather the Court was dealing with a property dispute of a cohabiting couple. The plaintiff was seeking recompense for twelve years
of household labour. The Court held that to establish unjust enrichment,
the defendant must have been enriched, the plaintiff must have been correspondingly deprived of a beneﬁt, and there must have been no juristic
reason for the enrichment.70 Once an unjust enrichment has been established, the court will then award either a constructive trust or damages.
In order for a constructive trust to be awarded, monetary compensation
must be inadequate, there must be a link between the beneﬁt conferred
and the property over which the trust is claimed, and the contribution
must be sufﬁciently substantial and direct so as to entitle the claimant to
a portion of the proceeds of disposition.	

    71 Despite having been decided
in the family law context, the principles in Peter v. Beblow could argu-
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ably be applied in cases where a party to a contract decides to sue in restitution where the stated criteria are met. The twelve-year cohabitation
of the parties in Peter v. Beblow was akin to a marital relationship, and
some argue that marriages are in essence contracts.72 Hence, it is at least
plausible to apply the Peter v. Beblow principles to contracts generally.
In Bank of America, the plaintiff bank can be said to have conferred
a beneﬁt upon the defendant trust company. The plaintiff, however,
clearly chose to afﬁrm the ATOC and pursue its action in breach of contract, rather than to disafﬁrm the contract and claim in restitution. At
ﬁrst glance, then, it appears that Major J. was ignoring precedent in applying restitution principles in Bank of America. However, a more probing analysis reveals that Major J. was relying upon the disgorgement of
proﬁts branch of restitution in his judgment. On this view, his decision
is arguably consistent with precedent applying disgorgement principles
in cases of breach of contract.
3. Disgorgement of Proﬁts
In cases of disgorgement the defendant is ordered to account for profits wrongfully made and to pay them to the plaintiff whether or not
the plaintiff suffered any corresponding loss. Disgorgement of proﬁts
has been awarded in cases of waiver of tort, where the interest of the
plaintiff is proprietary in nature, and where there have been breaches of
ﬁduciary duty.
In cases of waiver of tort, the plaintiff is said to have retrospectively
authorized the wrongful conduct of the defendant, and the defendant
is liable to account as an agent on the plaintiffʼ’s behalf. The remedy
is highly artiﬁcial,73 as the wrong is never actually condoned, but it is
one way for the plaintiff to retrieve proﬁts wrongfully made by the defendant where the plaintiff has not suffered any damage that would be
recoverable in tort. The artiﬁcial nature of the doctrine of waiver of
tort has created injustices, especially in cases of trespass where it was
commonly, but erroneously, held that waiver of tort was not available.	
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Wayleave cases, where trespassing defendants are ordered to pay plaintiffs a reasonable hire for the unauthorized use of land and the value
derived from the tort, have partially corrected this injustice.75
A similar remedy of disgorgement has been awarded to plaintiffs
whose proprietary interests were at issue in cases of breach of contract.
As noted above, the ordinary measure of damages for breach of contract
is the expectation measure. Whether the plaintiff held a proprietary interest was only relevant to the issue of whether to award speciﬁc performance; it did not entitle the plaintiff to disgorge the gains made by
the defendant through his or her breach. A plaintiff was not entitled to
an account of proﬁts or disgorgement for a mere breach of contract, but
was only entitled to the value of his or her loss. This principle was applied even in cases dealing with proprietary interests.	

   76
Maddaugh and McCamus offer two explanations for the exception
of allowing a disgorgement of proﬁts for a breach of contract where the
plaintiffʼ’s proprietary interests are at stake. First, the party in default
could also be concurrently in breach of another existing restitution obligation, such as breach of ﬁduciary duty. Second, there are
instances in which contractual damages in the traditional measure
are inadequate in a matter which has traditionally attracted equitable
relief, but where such relief is not, by reason of the circumstances of
the particular case, available to the plaintiff.77

The last category of cases allowing disgorgement of proﬁts for breach
of contract involves breaches of ﬁduciary duties. These cases often in-
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volved public servants that had either abused positions of trust78 or misused state secrets in the course of their employment in order to proﬁt.79
In such cases, the wrongdoers are often ordered to account for their
proﬁts made as a result of the breach, and to repay the same to their
employers.80
The last word on this subject comes from Attorney General v. Blake,	

    
81
although the case did not involve a breach of ﬁduciary duty. The
House of Lords in Blake came to a similar result as Reading and Snepp,
but it took a startlingly different approach in arriving at its decision.
George Blake acted as an agent for the Soviet Union while employed
by the British Government. He was found guilty of offences under the
Ofﬁcial Secrets Act and was sentenced to forty-two years in prison. He
escaped and ﬂed to Moscow, where he subsequently wrote his autobiography. While the information released in the autobiography was no
longer conﬁdential at the time of publication, its release nonetheless
breached Blakeʼ’s employment contract.
At trial, the Crownʼ’s claim for breach of ﬁduciary duty was rejected,
and was subsequently dismissed on appeal. The Crown decided not to
appeal this aspect of its claim before the House of Lords. Notwithstanding that decision, Lord Nicholls stated that he found it unsatisfactory
that an account of proﬁts would have been available had the release of
information constituted a breach of ﬁduciary duty, but not where the
same release of information merely amounted to a breach of contract.
He stated that:
if conﬁdential information is wrongfully divulged in breach of a
non-disclosure agreement, it would be nothing short of sophistry
to say that an account of proﬁts may be ordered in respect of the
equitable wrong but not in respect of the breach of contract which
governs the relationship between the parties.82

He continued:
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in contract, as well as tort, damages are not always narrowly
conﬁned to recoupment of ﬁnancial loss. In a suitable case damages
for breach of contract may be measured by the beneﬁt gained by the
wrongdoer from the breach. The defendant must make a reasonable
payment in respect of the beneﬁt he has gained.83

Lord Nicholls decided that damages, speciﬁc performance and injunctions, with the characterization of some contractual obligations as ﬁduciary, would ordinarily provide an adequate response to a breach of
contract.84 It is only in exceptional cases, “where those remedies are
inadequate, that any question of accounting for proﬁts will arise. No
ﬁxed rules can be prescribed.”85 Even though no ﬁxed rule can be set
out, Lord Nicholls states “a useful general guide…is whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in preventing the defendantʼ’s proﬁt-making activity and, hence, in depriving him of his proﬁt.”86 Lord Nicholls
thought that the present situation was one in which the plaintiff had a
legitimate interest. The Crown had a legitimate interest in deterring this
type of conduct in the future, and a disgorgement of proﬁts would send
a strong message that conduct similar to Blakeʼ’s would not permit a
wrongdoerʼ’s gain.87 He noted that Blakeʼ’s undertaking, if not a ﬁduciary
obligation, was closely akin to such an obligation where an account of
proﬁts is a standard remedy in the event of breach.88 Hence, Lord Nichollsʼ’ decision seems to be more concerned with the substance rather
than the form of the contractual relationship. He was not deterred from
awarding an account of proﬁts simply because there was no ﬁduciary
relationship.
Blake is a ground-breaking decision in England. It awarded a restitutionary account of proﬁts or disgorgement for a breach of contract
where there was no concurrent breach of ﬁduciary duty, nor any proprietary interests at stake. The decision seems to stray from the reasoning in
the earlier cases of Surrey County Council v. Bredero Homes89 and Jag83
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gard v. Sawyer,90 which were concerned with the distinction between
awarding damages under the Lord Cairnsʼ’ Act91 against damages for
breach of contract alone. Lord Nicholls did not want to strain existing
concepts in order to reach his desired result, which was something he
perceived earlier decisions as doing.92 He created a new general principle, rather than a rule, which allows disgorgement in cases of simple
breach of contract in exceptional cases. The plaintiff must have a “legitimate interest in preventing the defendantʼ’s proﬁt making activity.”
How this latter requirement will be interpreted remains to be seen. It is
clear, however, that in the English courts disgorgement will no longer
be limited to cases involving ﬁduciary breaches or special proprietary
interests of the plaintiff.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada did not consider Blake
in Bank of America, even though the Court decided to apply restitution
principles in a case of breach of contract. Just as the House of Lords
sought to avoid the constraints of ﬁtting into the categories of equitable
remedies when applying restitution in contract, the Supreme Court of
Canada did not want to be constrained by the traditional categories allowing compound interest on judgment awards in equity. In both cases,
traditional equitable principles restricted the availability of a remedy
at common law. It did not appear open to the Court to use restitution
principles in the sense of unjust enrichment from a beneﬁt conferred,
as the dispute in issue was brought in an action for breach of contract,
not for rescission and restitution. Instead, Major J. presumably relied
on the proprietary nature of the debt owed by Mutual Trust to Bank of
America in order to introduce disgorgement principles. While he does
not explicitly use the term “disgorgement,” both the context of Bank of
America and the absence of any discussion of Blake suggest that this
was his intended meaning. Such an application of disgorgement principles would be consistent with earlier case law involving proprietary interests in contract cases. The use of disgorgement principles in Bank of
America was presumably based on an attempt to make the “incremental
change” to the common law of allowing compound interest on judgment
awards appear less drastic.
In deciding to use restitution along with compensatory principles to
award compound interest on judgment awards, the Supreme Court of
91
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Canada implicitly seemed to realize that it was making another substantial change by making restitution available for a mere breach of contract. Major J. realized that he needed to minimize the availability of
restitution in cases of breach of contract. Instead of relying on the principles set out in Blake, the Court chose to limit its application to cases
involving inefﬁcient breaches.
The Supreme Court of Canada should have restrained itself to using compensatory principles in deciding to award compound judgment
interest at common law. Trying to limit the availability of compound
interest by limiting restitution to cases of inefﬁcient breach or by using
the Blake principles were both inappropriate options. As will be discussed below, it is unclear whether the use of disgorgement in cases of
breach of contract will be constrained to cases of inefﬁcient breach. By
allowing disgorgement in cases of breach of contract where there is an
inefﬁcient breach, the Court may have inadvertently transformed contract rights to property rights, as the cost of performance, rather than its
value, becomes available to plaintiffs in the event of such a breach.

IV. EFFICIENT BREACH AS A LIMIT TO RESTITUTION IN
CONTRACT
Instead of relying upon the general principle in Blake as a method to
limit restitution in contract to exceptional cases, the Supreme Court of
Canada chose to limit the use of restitution in contract with the doctrine
of efﬁcient breach. Major J. held in Bank of America that restitution
should only be available in cases where there is no efﬁcient breach, as
“efﬁcient breach should not be discouraged by the Courts.”93 The Court
describes efﬁcient breach as a Pareto optimal situation where one party
is better off, and no party is worse off.94 In such a situation, Major J.
ruled that a court should “usually award money damages for breach
of contract equal to the value of the bargain to the plaintiff.”95 In brief,
expectation damages for breach of contract support the theory of allow-
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ing efﬁcient breaches. This was recognized by R.A. Posner in Economic
Analysis of Law.96
Posner writes that expectation damages are value maximizing: if
the proﬁts gained from a breach of contract would exceed the proﬁts
expected to be made by the other party from the completion of the contract, and if damages are limited to the expectation measure, then there
is an incentive for the breach to occur (assuming that the breaching party would stand to make less of a proﬁt had the contract been performed
to completion). The party in default would likely be sued for breach of
contract, and would be liable to pay the plaintiff the expected value or
proﬁt to be made from the full completion of the contract. The result
is that the plaintiff would receive the expected value of the bargain,
and the defendant would be able to proﬁt from escaping its obligations
under the contract. Posner reasons that since neither party is worse off,
and one is better off, then the breach coupled with expectation damages
is value maximizing.97 Had the defendant been forced to complete the
performance of the contract, the plaintiff would be in the same situation,
but the defendant would be in a worse situation. Thus, expectation damages are more efﬁcient.
Several commentators have criticized the theory of efﬁcient breach.98
They argue that efﬁcient breach ignores transaction costs, relational
costs and externalities.99 It has been argued further that it is impossible
to determine whether a breach will be more efﬁcient under an expectation rule as opposed to a rule supporting speciﬁc performance, because
transaction costs are unique in every situation.100
The critics argue in favour of a rule that prefers speciﬁc performance101 over expectation damages, because the bargaining fostered by
96

2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
Ibid.
98
I.R. Macneil, “Efﬁcient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky” (1982) 68 Va. L. Rev. 947 at
950 [Macneil]. Lionel D. Smith, “Disgorgement of the Proﬁts of Breach of Contract: Property,
Contract and ʻ‘Efﬁcient Breachʼ’” (1994) 24 Can. Bus. L.J. 121 [Smith]. Daniel Friedmann, “The
Efﬁcient Breach Fallacy” (1989) 18 Journal of Legal Studies 1 [Friedmann]. Joseph M. Perillo,
“Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efﬁcient Breach and Tortious Interference” (2000) 68
Fordham L. Rev. 1085 [Perillo].
99
Macneil, ibid. at 957-958. Relational costs include loss of reputation from the breach and loss
of future opportunies to deal.
100
Ibid. at 952.
101
Ibid. at 960.
97

92 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

such a rule “seems ideally designed to prevent omission from the decisional calculus of the costs of either party.”102 They argue further that
condoning efﬁcient breaches may lead to an unwillingness to rely upon
suppliers.103 They contend that the law wants to discourage breaches,
efﬁcient or otherwise.104 This is evidenced by the tort of interference
with contract,105 which shows that the law does not want to encourage
wilful efﬁcient breaches of contract.106 The common thread among critics of efﬁcient breach is their preference of speciﬁc performance107 and
disgorgement of proﬁts108 instead of expectation damages for breach
of contract. These preferences lead the critics to the view that contract
rights should have the same status as property rights.109
The critics of efﬁcient breach go too far in asserting this position.
The objective of expectation damages is to compensate the plaintiff,
not to punish the defendant by disgorging his or her proﬁts.110 To allow
a remedy of speciﬁc performance or disgorgement of proﬁts for every
contract could amount to extortion against the party who breaches. One
would have to negotiate in every case where one wishes to be relieved
from the obligations of a contract. A reasonable non-breaching party
will only accept a settlement amount close to, or at, the value of the cost
of the expected performance.
It is incorrect to state that there is no difference between property
rights and contractual ones as suggested by the authors above. Contractual rights exist in personam,111 whereas property rights exist in rem.
Property rights face exposure to damage or conversion by anyone and
everyone, whereas the integrity of contract rights face a lower risk and
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generally this risk is conﬁned to the acts or omissions of another party to
the contract. One is in a better situation to assess the risks of a contract
upon formation as one can learn about the other partyʼ’s credit history,
for example. No degree of preparation can protect against all the risks
posed by acquiring property as against the world at large. Since property
rights face more risk, it is justiﬁable to allow a stronger remedy when
they are breached. Since the risk can be calculable in cases of contract,
it is reasonable to have a weaker remedy in most instances.
Additionally, if expectation damages were not the ordinary rule and
speciﬁc performance or disgorgement of proﬁts were available for all
breaches, then one would naturally be more reluctant to enter contracts.
More time and money would be invested into ensuring that one is entering a proﬁtable bargain. This in itself is inefﬁcient. On the other hand,
if one restricts ordinary breaches of contract to expectation damages
generally, then there is commercial certainty and no one will ever be
any worse off. Parties will be more willing to enter contracts if they
know that they will ordinarily be limited to paying for the value of the
performance on the event of a breach, as opposed to its cost.
The belief that contract rights should attract the same legal protection as property rights leads to opposition to any theory which supports
ﬁnding a distinction between such rights. Efﬁcient breach clearly embraces such a distinction, as it relies upon the availability of expectation damages for breach of contract. As noted above, there is a clear
distinction between contract rights and property rights, and the same
protection should not be offered to both. Expectation damages are necessary to promote the willingness to enter contracts and they are fair in
that they fully compensate the plaintiff without punishing the defendant. Further, expectation damages have the incidental effect of deterring
some breaches; contractual parties will want to avoid tarnishing their
goodwill, for example.
Efﬁcient breach recognizes the difference between contractual
rights and property rights and the Supreme Court of Canada was correct in recognizing this difference. In doing so, Major J. chose to limit
the availability of restitution in contract to cases involving non-efﬁcient
breaches. He chose to adopt restitution principles to expand the availability of compound interest, but he realized that this would have the
unfortunate result of elevating contractual rights to the status of property rights. Hence, it was necessary for him to backtrack and endorse
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efﬁcient breach effectively to negate the impact of allowing restitution
in contract. However, this distinction was already inherent in the common law which generally supports expectation damages for breach of
contract. The need speciﬁcally to endorse efﬁcient breach could have
been avoided had the Supreme Court restricted its analysis to compensatory principles.

V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF BANK OF AMERICA
While it was necessary to place a check on the availability of restitution
in contract, the application of restitution principles in Bank of America
was unnecessary in the ﬁrst place. Mitchell McInnes points out that the
award of compound interest could have stood on compensatory principles alone in Bank of America.112
Considering the plaintiff was owed a sum of money by the defendant, the award needed to reﬂect the time value of money to comprise adequate compensation. This could only be achieved through compound
interest. Instead of simply extending the common law to allow compound
interest on compensatory principles, the Court chose to apply restitution
principles. To limit the availability of restitution, the Supreme Court
indicated that restitution should not be available where a breach is efﬁcient. Major J. held that since the breach in the case at hand was a zero
sum optimal (inefﬁcient), as opposed to a Pareto optimal, then restitution could be awarded as there was no efﬁcient breach. McInnes points
out that if restitution is limited to cases involving inefﬁcient breach, then
its use is redundant.113 Where there is no efﬁcient breach, a plaintiffʼ’s
loss is capable of supporting the same relief on compensatory principles
alone.114 It is only where a defendantʼ’s gain exceeds the plaintiffʼ’s loss
(an efﬁcient breach) that disgorgement makes any difference, as compensation alone would allow the defendant to retain his proﬁt. McInnes
therefore concludes “the restitution principle appears limited to cases in
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which it is unnecessary. It can only catch those wrongful gains that are
mirrored by compensable losses.”115
While McInnes is correct in stating that the Court has effectively
limited the applicability of restitution to cases where it is redundant,
this appears to have been Major J.ʼ’s intent. He wanted to implement
restitution principles merely as a vehicle to change the common law
incrementally to allow compound interest. He did not want to make restitution available in contract generally – thus, he chose to limit its effect
by conﬁning its employment to cases of non-efﬁcient breach. As noted
above, the redundancy of restitution in these circumstances supports the
position that Major J. introduced restitution principles for the sole reason of facilitating his incremental change to the common law.
McInnes feels that it is unfortunate that Major J. restricts the application of disgorgement principles to cases involving inefﬁcient breaches,
and he would have preferred that disgorgement be available to breaches
of contract generally where the defendant is guilty of some wrongdoing.116 But McInnesʼ’ desire supports the view that contract rights should
have the same status as property rights. Further, McInnesʼ’ position ignores the purpose of expectation damages in contract, which is compensation, rather than punishment.117 To punish a wrongdoer for breaching a
contract and thereby making a proﬁt is a remedy best suited to the public
law or criminal law setting, not to private law claims; it is a societal, not
a private, objective.
Unfortunately, there is evidence in Bank of America which might
be relied upon in future cases to extend restitution in contract beyond
cases of inefﬁcient breach. If one considers closely the facts in Bank of
115
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America, it becomes apparent that the Supreme Court in effect awarded
restitution in a case of efﬁcient breach. Mutual Trust may have relied
on the state of the law as it stood prior to Bank of America in making
its decision to breach the TOC and the ATOC. Mutual Trust may have
reasoned that if it breached the TOC or the ATOC, then under the existing state of the law only simple interest would have been available on
a judgment award given to Bank of America. At the same time, Mutual
Trust could have planned on investing the money that it owed to Bank
of America at compound rates. Mutual Trust would proﬁt by breaching, as it would pay simple interest on any judgement award to Bank of
America, while earning compound interest itself.118 The Supreme Court
actually presumed that Mutual Trust engaged in this exact scheme.119
Since Justice Majorʼ’s decision effectively does exactly what it holds is
impermissible (i.e. awards restitution in a case of efﬁcient breach), then
his decision might be interpreted by subsequent cases as merely setting
forth a general discretionary principle. This is further supported by Major J.ʼ’s statement that “efﬁcient breach should not be discouraged by the
Courts.”120 He did not state that it must not be discouraged.
Apart from the ambiguity as to whether restitution could ever be
awarded in cases of efﬁcient breach, the Court is also unclear as to what
meaning it ascribes to the term “restitution.” Looking at the language
used, it could be argued that the Court was referring to restitution in the
unjust enrichment sense. However, considering its actions, it appears
that a disgorgement of proﬁts was taking place. In support of ﬁnding
that the Court was referring to unjust enrichment, it is noteworthy that it
did not address the need for Bank of America to mitigate its loss. Since
mitigation is not a requirement in a claim for unjust enrichment,121 this
would seem to suggest that the Court was not referring to disgorgement.
Further, the Court cites Waddamsʼ’ The Law of Damages122 when it explains the availability of restitution in contract.123 The passage referred
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to examines cases where an action was brought to recover beneﬁts conferred by the plaintiff, not to cases of disgorgement.
As has been stressed throughout this article, however, there is ample evidence indicating that the Court was referring to disgorgement
when it used the term “restitution.” It is important to recall that Bank of
America had a proprietary interest at stake in the case, and violations
of proprietary interests have given rise to disgorgement of proﬁts in the
past. Perhaps most importantly, Bank of Americaʼ’s claim was for damages for breach of contract. This was determinative for McInnes, and led
him to conclude that the Court was referring to disgorgement.124 Finally,
since the award of compound interest essentially deprived Mutual Trust
of any compound interest it may have gained from a third party, and
the compound interest was not a beneﬁt conferred by Bank of America,
it is suggested that the Court was referring to disgorgement of proﬁts.
Although the balance is tipped in concluding the Supreme Court was
referring to disgorgement, the equivocal nature of its decision leaves
open the possibility for future decisions to interpret Bank of America as
referring to unjust enrichment.
In addition to the ambiguity over which sense of the term “restitution” was used by the Court, it is unclear how restricted the application
of compound interest is meant to be in future cases. At ﬁrst glance, it
may appear that the Court is restricting the application of compound
interest to situations which are factually similar to those in Bank of
America; that is, where the parties are both commercial lenders and are
familiar with the operation of compound interest schemes. This was a
signiﬁcant factor in Major J.ʼ’s analysis. Major J. relied on the foreseeability principle set out in Hadley v. Baxendale125 for limiting the application of compound interest to cases where the parties contemplated
at the outset of their relationship that compound interest would govern
their transactions.126 In this regard, Major J. stated:
With respect to the failure to repay the loan in this appeal when
due, it cannot be said that the cost of such delay was not in the
contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract,
particularly as both parties were in the business of lending. … Absent
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exceptional circumstances, the interest rate which had governed the
loan prior to breach would be the appropriate rate to govern the
post-breach loan.127

Despite the apparent limiting effect of the passage above, Major J. later
stated:
an award of compound pre- and post-judgment interest will generally
be limited to breach of contract cases where there is evidence that
the parties agreed, knew, or should have known, that the money
which is the subject of the dispute would bear compound interest
as damages. It may by awarded as consequential damages in other
cases but there would be the usual requirement of proving that
damage component.128 [Emphasis added].

It is therefore clear that the Court is not necessarily restricting the awarding of compound interest to cases where the test in Hadley is met. Compound interest may be available where a plaintiff suffers consequential
losses in mitigating his or her damages. At the very least, it appears that
that compound interest could be awarded as consequential damages.
Bank of America has subsequently been followed in provinces other
than Ontario. British Columbia lacks provisions similar to Ontarioʼ’s
s.128 and s.129 of the Courts of Justice Act. Notwithstanding that fact,
its Supreme Court initially embraced Bank of America.129 Only a month
later, however, the British Columbia Supreme Court held Bank of America did not apply in British Columbia, as “there are no sections in the
British Columbia statute which are comparable to ss. 128 and 129 of the
Ontario statute.”130 Although Paciﬁc Playground Holdings was a case
dealing with sophisticated commercial parties, it does suggest a willingness to apply the Bank of America decision broadly. Still, there is obviously disagreement in British Columbia as to whether Bank of America
applies to its legislation.
Fortunately, the cases to date referring to Bank of America have focussed on the compensatory portion of the Supreme Courtʼ’s analysis.
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The Alberta Court of Appeal in Alberta (Minister of Infrastructure) v.
Nilsson131 viewed Bank of America
as abrogating the narrow interpretation compound interest is
available under the common law. …Bank of America mandates a
common law availability where compound interest is necessary to
compensate accurately for the proven damages.132

As McInnes suggested, Bank of America could have been decided on
compensatory principles alone. This would have resulted in a fairer application of awarding compound interest.
The purpose of awarding judgment interest is to compensate plaintiffs rather than to punish defendants: the plaintiff is to receive the time
value of money that is rightly due to him or her under a judgment award.
The Supreme Court acceded to this point in the course of its judgment.133
In not applying mitigation principles, however, the Supreme Court may
have overcompensated the plaintiff and punished the defendant. In Bank
of America, the cause of action was breach of contract. Therefore, mitigation principles should have applied. Suppose Bank of America had
mitigated its loss by borrowing money from another party. It could then
have lent that money to a third party for the same rate of compound
interest set out in the ATOC and the TOC. It would have saved itself
from losing any compound interest on the principal amount, except for
the intervening time that it took to secure a loan, and except for the
interest that it would have owed to the creditor. Mutual Trust should
then only have been held liable to repay the interest paid to the creditor, and for the interest lost during the intervening period. Perhaps this
overly complicated scenario was something which the Supreme Court
wished to avoid, and it introduced restitution principles in the hopes that
mitigation principles would no longer apply. But, as was stated above,
it is unclear to which sense of the term “restitution” the Supreme Court
referred.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The effects of the Bank of America decision are as far reaching as they
are equivocal. Due to the uncertain effects that this judgment will have,
the majority of the House of Lords appears to have been correct in Westdeutsche when it was stated that extending the availability of compound
interest on judgment awards is a matter that is best left to the legislature.
Awarding compound interest does serve better to compensate a plaintiff.
The unforeseen difﬁculties that may arise from Bank of America, however, suggest that law reform studies should have been undertaken prior
to making such a drastic change.
However, since the Supreme Court did not think it appropriate to
wait for legislative intervention, it could have at the very least restricted
its analysis to compensatory principles and avoided the use of restitution principles in contract. By so doing, it could have achieved the same
result, but without the confusion that results from its ambiguous use of
the term “restitution.”

